Internet Systems Consortium Security Advisory.

Mark Andrews Mark_Andrews at isc.org
Fri Nov 3 00:08:30 UTC 2006


                Internet Systems Consortium Security Advisory.
                   BIND 9: OpenSSL Vulnerabilities.
                             31 October 2006

Versions affected:
	BIND 9.0.x (all versions of BIND 9.0)
	BIND 9.1.x (all versions of BIND 9.1)
	BIND 9.2.0, 9.2.1, 9.2.2, 9.2.3, 9.2.4, 9.2.5, 9.2.6, 9.2.6-P1,
	     9.2.7b1, 9.2.7rc1 and 9.2.7rc2
	BIND 9.3.0, 9.3.1, 9.3.2, 9.3.2-P1, 9.3.3b1, 9.3.3rc1 and 9.3.3rc2
        BIND 9.4.0a1, 9.4.0a2, 9.4.0a3, 9.4.0a4, 9.4.0a5, 9.4.0a6, 9.4.0b1
	     and 9.4.0b2

Severity: Moderate (see below)
Exploitable: Remotely

Description:

	Because of OpenSSL's recently announced vulnerabilities
	(CAN-2006-4339, CVE-2006-2937 and CVE-2006-2940) which affect named,
	we are announcing this workaround and releasing patches.  A proof of
	concept attack on OpenSSL has been demonstrated for CAN-2006-4339.

	OpenSSL is required to use DNSSEC with BIND.  ISC had included
        the OpenSSL library in the BIND distribution, and in more recent
	versions, the OpenSSL library was required, but no longer a part
	of the distribution.

Workaround:

	Recompile named with a known good version of OpenSSL.
	OpenSSL 0.9.8d and 0.9.7l or greater are known to be good
	versions.

	For both KEY and DNSKEY resource record types, Generate
	RSASHA1 and RSAMD5 keys using the -e option to dnssec-keygen
	if the current keys were generated using the default exponent
	of 3.  You can determine if a key is vulnerable by looking
	at the algorithm (1 or 5) and the first three characters
	of the base64 encoded RSA key.

	RSASHA1 (5) and RSAMD5 (1) keys that start with AQM, AQN, AQO
        or AQP are vulnerable.

	For example, this RSASHA1 (5) key is vulnerable and needs to be
	replaced as the base64 encoded RSA key starts with AQP.

	DNSKEY 256 3 5 ( AQPGP80zt8pQS5xVaaaD054XBet8sCKaYZ9WrnYyuznqNX
			 kS91j6qqHuw7Y9kKAVsFoWfNw0CpahdIJIhUPFM1JRJtXh
		         Ny1cg9Ok3kBnN+fwCe2LY3qOtweFbL9bSjgolQWr42AlFO
		         jZnJVW1cECgVBfinKHBIEIIwIdHGGuLyIQaQ== )

	Note: the use of RSAMD5 (1) is no longer recommended.

	Once you have generated new keys, use the key rollover
	process of your choice to put them into production. We
	expect your normal (non-emergency) processes to be adequate,
	however, you should do your own risk analysis against the
	costs of exploitation of weak keys and proceed accordingly.

Fix:

	Upgrade to BIND 9.2.6-P2, BIND 9.2.3-P2, BIND 9.2.7rc3,
	BIND 9.3.3rc3 or BIND 9.4.0b3 then generate new RSASHA1 and
	RSAMD5 keys for all old keys using the old default exponent
	and perform a key rollover to these new keys.  See above
	for how to determine if you are using the old default exponent.

	These new versions of named check that the OpenSSL version meet
	the mininum revision levels at configure time -- for Windows,
	compile time.

	These versions also change the default RSA exponent to be
	65537 which is not vulnerable to the attacks described in
	CAN-2006-4339.

			http://www.isc.org/



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