USADOTGOV.NET Root Problems?
Warren Kumari
warren at kumari.net
Sat Jul 24 09:10:39 UTC 2010
On Jul 23, 2010, at 2:37 PM, Danny Mayer wrote:
> On 7/22/2010 11:08 PM, Merton Campbell Crockett wrote:
>> Thanks for the confirmation that the problem was related to DNSSEC.
>>
>> I didn't see your message until I got home from work; however, I did
>> find the root of the problem late this afternoon. At each of our
>> Internet egress and ingress points, we have Cisco ASA devices sitting in
>> front of a pair of redundant firewalls. Each ASA is configured with the
>> default DNS inspect policy that doesn't accept fragmented UDP packets.
>
> Why would any inspection policy not allow fragmented UDP packets?
> There's nothing wrong with that.
Because it's "hard".... The issue is that then you need to buffer fragments until you get a full packet -- which leaves you open to attacks that send a bunch of fragments but leave one of them out.
Vendors like to avoid reassembling fragments by default, because it makes their performance numbers better....
W
>
> Danny
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