DNSSEC and split DNS
marka at isc.org
Thu Oct 24 00:20:23 UTC 2013
In message <5268626C.8040603 at networktest.com>, David Newman writes:
> On 10/23/13 4:28 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
> > You sign all versions of the zone.
> > As for key management you can:
> > * use the same keys in all views which makes mobile device
> > management simpler as there is no need to distribute keys.
> > Validating from the root will work in all cases though
> > there is still something to be said for distributing keys
> > for local zones locally as this prevents resolution
> > failures when the site is disconnected from the rest of
> > the world.
> > * different keys per view. You will need to distribute the
> > keys and for mobile devices they will need all sets of
> > keys as they see both the internal and external views
> > depending apon where they attach to the network and whether
> > there is a VPN active. For fixed devices different keys
> > will cause data leakage to be rejected as the leaked data
> > won't validate.
> > You can change strategy if you pick the wrong one.
> Thanks, makes sense.
> What about delegation? Right now, there is none between external zones
> and internal forward zones using RFC 1918 addresses.
> I *think* option 1 would require, for example, example.org's zone to
> include delegation and glue records for internal.example.org to keep the
> chain of trust intact.
> And I *think* option 2 in theory could be set up as an island of trust,
> with no delegation from parent domains.
* add the delegation for internal.example.org to example.org
and make it visible to the world with a appropriate acl on
* have two version of example.org, one with and one without the
delegation for internal.example.org.
* you can add a trust anchor for internal.example.org.
As more validation takes place in applications the first two
will be easier to mangage.
> Thanks again
> > Mark
> > In message <526857A2.8050405 at networktest.com>, David Newman writes:
> >> What is the recommended practice for adding DNSSEC to an environment
> >> that currently uses split DNS?
> >> Apologies as I'm sure this has come up before, but most discussion I
> >> found on bind-users was from 1999, and this isn't covered in the ARM.
> >> I did find this draft (not RFC) from 2007, but even the author
> >> acknowledges that some examples given can invite misconfiguration:
> >> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krishnaswamy-dnsop-dnssec-split-view-04
> >> On the surface, split DNS and DNSSEC have seemingly opposite goals: One
> >> seeks to provide different responses to queries for the same resource,
> >> and the other seeks to prevent it.
> >> Is there some way of reconciling these?
> >> Thanks
> >> dn
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list
> >> bind-users mailing list
> >> bind-users at lists.isc.org
> >> https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
> Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list
> bind-users mailing list
> bind-users at lists.isc.org
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: marka at isc.org
More information about the bind-users