Installing bind is not very clear for me

[Leandro]

Reindl , I agree with you.
One Firewall should be enough.
So, what you consider this firewall should do ?
In my opinion:
Block requests coming from a blacklist (Who will generate this list ?)
Block denial of service requests. It needs to measure the requests rate 
to detects when is under attack.
Block port scanners on publics ips.

I dont know what else ....
Thanks.
Leandro.


On 04/09/15 15:49, Reindl Harald wrote:
>
>
> Am 04.09.2015 um 20:41 schrieb Leandro:
>> I think that regarding security issues, is better to prevent as much as
>> possible.
>> Here we have two different opinions:
>> People that agree to use firewall and people against (or arguing that is
>> not necessary):
>>
>> I would like to hear both and then decide. If we share our points maybe
>> can get a better conclusions
>>
>> So I would like to learn about firewall techniques to protect a DNS.
>> And for people against firewall , wich are the security considerations
>> to take in order to protect the service without firewall.
>
> AFAIR nobody said anything against firewalls in general, but the 
> "multiple firewalls in a row" is just nonsense and don't improve 
> security in a deterministic way
>
> but it brings more points of failure and in the worst case more 
> vulnerable points in case of one or more of that firewalls are 
> outdated and vulerable itself - commercial "security appliances" are 
> famous for all sort of outdated software where a simple security audit 
> shows you more vulerabilities on that crap than in your whole network 
> (Barracuda Networks as example)
>
> what you need is *one* firewall you trust
>
> if you don't trust it and that is the only valid reason to build up a 
> cascade of firewalls put it out of your network
>
> mostly people who are throwing as much as possible appliances and 
> firewalls in front of their machines doing that because missing 
> knowledge and hope some of the stuff they are throwing in the mix will 
> magically catch whatever - that's not how security really works, you 
> need to understand what you are installing and doing, throwing as much 
> as possible things in the mix just leads that you no longer understand 
> what your own network really does, but that don't bother attackers 
> shooting blindly with all sorts of expolits in the hope one hits
>
> well, and that attackers are shooting directly to your firewalls too
>
>
>> On 04/09/15 14:27, Mike Hoskins (michoski) wrote:
>>> On 9/4/15, 1:12 PM, "bind-users-bounces at lists.isc.org on behalf of
>>> /dev/rob0" <bind-users-bounces at lists.isc.org on behalf of 
>>> rob0 at gmx.co.uk>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> On Thu, Sep 03, 2015 at 11:02:23PM +0200, Reindl Harald wrote:
>>>>> Am 03.09.2015 um 22:59 schrieb Robert Moskowitz:
>>>>>> On 09/03/2015 04:35 PM, Leandro wrote:
>>>>>>> Ok ...
>>>>>>> I got BIND 9.10.2-P3  working.
>>>>>>> I compiled with
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ./configure --with-openssl --enable-threads --with-libxml2
>>>>>>> --with-libjson
>>>>>>> make
>>>>>>> make install
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Json statistics channel is working and chroot is not longer
>>>>>>> mandatory.
>>>>>> But do make sure you have selinux enforced.  Or run behind
>>>>>> multiple firewalls...
>>>>> behind *multiple firewalls* - ?!?! - oh come on and get serious
>>>>> instead promote snakeoil -
>>>> I quite agree here.  Firewalls that attempt to filter DNS have
>>>> terrible reputations for *breaking* DNS.  A single firewall is bad
>>>> enough; multiple firewalls sounds like a disaster.
>>>
>>> True, have fixed many of those over the years, though in fairness 
>>> this is
>>> often a matter of expecting to run a firewall (or anything) "out of 
>>> box"
>>> without understanding the config.  If that's the stance of the 
>>> admin, you
>>> likely have a lot more to worry about security-wise than named
>>> chroot.  :-)
>>>
>>>
>>>>> typically BIND is *not* running as root and hence does not need
>>>>> any special handling compared to any other network service
>>>> I don't know if we can say what is "typical".  We can say, for
>>>> running on Linux at least, that running as root is safe.  A
>>>> compromised named would get root after having dropped superuser
>>>> privileges, so it wouldn't be able to do much.
>>>
>>> I probably misunderstand your response or am reading too much into the
>>> wording.  Named doesn't run as root due to -u giving up permissions.
>>> That
>>> combined with the fact chroot itself has known shortcomings is why it's
>>> fallen out of BCP amongst name server operators.  It's not that anyone
>>> suggests the alternative to chroot is to just run as root. You are 
>>> still
>>> running as a non-privileged user post-startup, and permissioning things
>>> appropriately to minimize damage in the event of a compromise.
>>>
>>>
>>>> Regardless, again I quite agree that special handling is not
>>>> necessary.  Look at the various BIND9 security announcements over
>>>> the years.  When have you seen one which involved a compromise of
>>>> any kind?
>>>>
>>>> I cannot say with authority that BIND9 has never had a compromise,
>>>> but I am confident in saying I have never seen one.
>>>
>>> I appreciate the viewpoint, and I can even agree with it, but the 
>>> past is
>>> not necessarily a key to the future.  The reality is none of the 
>>> nastiest
>>> 0-days were ever expected.  As a security professional you try to
>>> insulate
>>> against potential risks, not just things you have already observed.  
>>> It's
>>> up to each operator to determine appropriate cost/benefit, and this is
>>> not
>>> an argument for chroot, but I do caution against an "I've never seen it
>>> before so wouldn't worry about it" stance on security.
>
>
>
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