'succesful' nsupdate of remote server not persistent across nameserver restart?
matt at conundrum.com
Tue Apr 26 18:18:35 UTC 2016
On 25 April 2016 at 11:44, <jasonsu at mail-central.com> wrote:
> I completely gave up on chroot'd ntpd because of the endless weirdness.
> Finally just moved to openntpd as (1) it had safe privsep, (2) no chroot
> req'd, and (3) did the job I need.
Privsep doesn't actually fix the same problem chroot does. As I
understand it, privsep reduces the attack surface for remote execution
exploits by shuffling off privileged operations to a separate process, but
if that process isn't chrooted and it has a remote code execution flaw then
your entire system is opened up to attack. Likewise, the unprivileged
process still has access to your entire system, and may still be used to
execute unprivileged code in the event of a remote execution
vulnerability. Combined with other flaws in the system, both can still
lead to a privileged remote attack. By contrast, chroot contains the
results of a successful remote execution to the environment of that
process, preventing a successful remote execution attack from touching the
filesystem outside the chroot... which limits the possible damage to the
exploited process. Both things together are better than either one alone.
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