Slaves or Forwarders?

Matus UHLAR - fantomas uhlar at
Thu Aug 25 20:06:00 UTC 2016

>In message <844475874024407090c1c2e9d5718297 at>, "Darcy Kevin
> (FCA)" writes:
>> From an InfoSec standpoint, of course one would prefer to use
>> cryptographic methods of securing DNS data, but, in the absence of that,
>> slaving could, arguably, be considered more secure than forwarding, in
>> the sense that forwarding usually generates more network transactions,
>> over time, for any given resolution of any given name, and thus more
>> chances for a bad guy to successfully spoof a response and have that
>> forged answer be cached.
>> One could also eke out a small measure of extra security (again, if
>> cryptographic methods are for some reason unavailable) by turning off
>> IXFR and thus causing all zone transfers to occur with AXFR, which is
>> TCP-based and thus presumably harder to spoof. But, that's a heavy price
>> to pay for a small increment of extra security. Better to go for crypto,
>> at that point, either within the DNS protocol itself (e.g. TSIG, DNSSEC),
>> by implementing (as many have) an out-of-band method of replicating zone
>> data (e.g. rsync-over-ssh, Infoblox-style "grid replication" over OpenVPN
>> tunnels) or by securing *all* communicati on between nameserver instances
>> (e.g. IPSEC tunnels).

On 24.08.16 08:00, Mark Andrews wrote:
>named only accepts IXFR over TCP.  While the protocol supports sending
>deltas with IXFR/UDP named does not use that part of the protocol.

just IXFRs or AXFRs too?
Isn't edns over UDP enough in many cases?
Matus UHLAR - fantomas, uhlar at ;
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