"Hiding" version.bind in /etc/bind/named.conf.options doesn't work
warren at kumari.net
Wed Feb 28 19:51:11 UTC 2018
On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 12:57 PM, G.W. Haywood via bind-users
<bind-users at lists.isc.org> wrote:
> Hi there,
> On Wed, 28 Feb 2018, (Ing. Pedro Pablo Delgado Martell) wrote:
>> Good morning, I'm trying to make it more difficult for an attacker to
>> get my DNS server version.
> Waste of time. The attacks are automated, and will be mounted anyway.
Thank you - this has long been a position that I've held/espoused.
It is easier / cheaper / faster for an attacker to simply assume that
a machine is running vulnerable software and try all exploits on it,
instead of carefully checking to see what services / versions a server
advertises and restricting to those.
Also, if you are *not* running a vulnerable version of <software>, it
doesn't matter if the attacker knocks on the door, and if you *are*
running a vulnerable version, having the attacker not know that
doesn't provide you any protection.
I realize that this sounds somewhat ranty, but I've recently had to
deal with some checklist-style security audits / certifications which
require things like hiding version information (and pointing at the
"firewall") while completely ignoring actual security issues (like
"are the versions known vulnerable", "are the firewalls / ACLS /
whatever sane", "do your users know not to click on
unpaid_invoice.doc", "do you use 2FA", "are all your credential
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I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad
idea in the first place.
This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing
regret at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair
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