RHEL9+, RSASHA1 and CVE-2025-8677

[Petr Menšík]

Can you please share a public domain name where this can be tested? I 
promise we won't steal it from you. I can create some for testing, but 
that would delay delivering fixes even more.

No, it should not happen and is undesired issue if it does. I admit we 
run bind9 test suite with DEFAULT:SHA1 policy to avoid unexpected false 
positives. If we had this fixed properly, it might have warned us. But 
we are still preparing unmodified upstream fixes. This seems like a 
regression we want to fix too.

I admit we do not have any our test doing validation of disabled and 
supported algorithm at the same time. It seems like one should be 
created ASAP.

On 31/10/2025 13:05, sthaug at nethelp.no wrote:
>> No. Algorithm 5 and 7 are skipped earlier and should never reach the
>> code affected.
> However, the observed behavior, which started this, is that a zone
> signed with both algorithm 7 and algorithm 13, failed. The client
> (me) received SERVFAIL.
>
>> No crypto policy will change any of this, you do not have to lower
>> your security defaults to avoid that.
> Well, the policy change that Bjørn made definitely make the zone
> in question resolve again.
>
>> Please wait few days, proper fixed are on the way!
> Unfortunately the real world doesn't have that kind of patience.
>
> Steinar Haug, AS2116
It is our current top priority and I cannot comment it more.

-- 
Petr Menšík
Senior Software Engineer, RHEL
Red Hat, https://www.redhat.com/
PGP: DFCF908DB7C87E8E529925BC4931CA5B6C9FC5CB