[bind10-dev] NSEC3 consideration

Mark Andrews marka at isc.org
Mon Oct 31 01:33:10 UTC 2011


In message <520024431.18006 at cnnic.cn> <1320024430.1536.4.camel at zenus>, Kevin Tes writes:
> Hi,
> 
> As RFC 5155(DNS Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
> Existence)suggests that, there are eight case for NSEC3 Hashed
> Authenticated Denial of Existence.
> 
> First:    Name error,
> Second:   No data QTYPE is not DS,
> Third:    No data QTYPE is DS,
> Fourth:   Wildcard no data, 
> Fifth:    Wildcard answer,
> Sixth:    Referrals to unsigned subzone,
> Seventh:  Query for NSEC3,
> Eighth:   Run-Time Collision.
> 
> Divide those to four categories,each category is an independent task.
> 
> <1> First
> <2> Second,Third,Sixth,Seventh
> <3> Fourth
> <4> Fifth
> 
> For the hash algorithm specified in this document SHA-1, Run-Time Collision are highly unlikely happened,
> so do not take 'eighth' into account.

Queries for NSEC3 records should always fail as NSEC3 records are
in a different namespace.

-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka at isc.org



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