BIND 10 #1386: fallback from EDNS over UDP to plain DNS or EDNS/DNS over TCP is needed in real life
BIND 10 Development
do-not-reply at isc.org
Tue Dec 20 09:30:00 UTC 2011
#1386: fallback from EDNS over UDP to plain DNS or EDNS/DNS over TCP is needed in
real life
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
Reporter: dvv | Owner: dvv
Type: | Status: reviewing
defect | Milestone:
Priority: major | Sprint-20111220
Component: | Resolution:
resolver | Sensitive: 0
Keywords: EDNS | Sub-Project: DNS
fallback | Estimated Difficulty: 0
Defect Severity: High | Total Hours: 0
Feature Depending on Ticket: |
resolver |
Add Hours to Ticket: 0 |
Internal?: 0 |
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
Changes (by vorner):
* owner: vorner => dvv
Comment:
Hello
Replying to [comment:11 dvv]:
> > However, I'm not sure if this fallback behaviour is the right one to
do. Does it make sense? For what I see, the behaviour of the name server
is wrong. So making the usual fallback (where the server doesn't know edns
at all) slower seems bad because of it. What use is the EDNS on tcp
anyway? As the EDNS doesn't really work well for the server, we can assume
it doesn't use it to pass any fancy options. And we don't need larger
packets over TCP. So, it would probably make sense to fallback either to
UDP without EDNS directly (and then do the usual TCP fallback, if needed
because of size) or directly to TCP without EDNS. What is the advantage of
this (your) way?
>
> In theory, it might be useful if we send a DNSSEC query to an upstream
server that refuses to do EDNS over UDP. But at the moment, the resolver
ignores the DO flag in queries from clients, so it's kinda moot. I
disabled the TCP fallback and just left the basic fallback to non-EDNS UDP
in place.
Well, my thinking was, if the server really supported DNSSEC, the authors
must have tried it at last little bit and they would have found out it
doesn't work over UDP. So not being able to answer EDNS correctly could
IMO be a good approximation of not supporting DNSSEC.
> > Also, we may want to remember these things in the NSAS. I'm not sure
if it supports flags for now, but it should be at last noted in some TODO
we want to do it, and possibly create a ticket for it somewhere in
backlog.
>
> That was the TODO part that jinmei found unnecessary at the moment.
bind9 uses a whole lot of heuristics to determine what an upstream
server's malfunctions are, it may be useful to replicate some or all of
that functionality, too.
I agree with that. However, I still think we want to remember what we
found out about the servers, to not need to query multiple times just to
trigger the heuristic again. Anyway, it's not goal of this ticket.
I believe it can be merged.
Thanks
--
Ticket URL: <http://bind10.isc.org/ticket/1386#comment:12>
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