KSK rollover, set revoke bit unconditionally ? (cfr RFC5011)

[Marc Lampo]

Hello,

in RFC5011, section 6.6, "Trust Point Deletion" (== KSK rollover),
there is an unconditional statement to set the REVOKE bit on the "old" KSK, once the parent zone publishes the DS record of the new KSK.

I / we at EURId / are interested to learn if this unconditional setting of the revocation bit is generally considered as best practice ?
This, in my opinion, adds more complexity for the administrator of DNSSEC zones.

Isn't it enough to use the revoke bit only in case of an actual/suspected compromise ?

Your comments are welcome !

Kind regards,

Marc Lampo


--- Security Officer for EURid --- http://www.linkedin.com/pub/dir/Marc/Lampo

 		 	   		  
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